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Abstract
We explore the new roles of rules of origin (ROO) when multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) manipulate their transfer prices to avoid a high corporate tax. The ROO 
under a free trade agreement (FTA) require exporters to identify the origin of 
exports to be eligible for a preferential tariff rate. We find that a value-added crite-
rion of ROO restricts abusive transfer pricing by MNEs. Interestingly, an FTA with 
ROO can induce MNEs to shift profits from a low- to high-tax country. Because 
the ROO augment tax revenues inside FTA countries, they can transform a welfare-
reducing FTA into a welfare-improving one.
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1 Introduction
Tax avoidance by multinational enterprises (MNEs) has become controversial in the 
last two decades of rapid globalization. The Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development (OECD) estimates that countries lose 4–10% of corporate 
income tax revenue annually because of profit shifting.1 One way to shift profits 
across countries is to manipulate the price of intra-firm trade (transfer price), which 
is known as abusive transfer pricing. Because MNEs determine the prices of trans-
actions among related companies, they manipulate these prices to decrease profits in 
high-tax countries and conversely increase profits in low-tax countries. Some empir-
ical research has provided evidence of transfer pricing being used to save tax pay-
ments.2 Because the taxes paid by firms are one of the main sources of government 
revenues, tax avoidance by MNEs has become a serious issue, as trade liberalization 
and the creation of global value chains increase intra-firm trade and provide MNEs 
with greater opportunities to redistribute their tax base to low-tax countries.
Our primary focus is on how such losses of tax revenues are linked to trade lib-
eralization driven by trade agreements. Trade agreements among countries facili-
tate firms’ exports and imports. They also influence firm behaviors in other respects 
including transfer pricing and generate more complicated welfare effects. In particu-
lar, the specific rules needed to implement trade agreements complicate the effects 
of trade liberalization.
We focus on the rules of origin (ROO) of a free trade agreement (FTA), which 
require exporters in member countries making tariff-free exports to other member 
countries to prove that the exported products originated within the FTA.3 To meet 
the ROO, firms may change their strategies such as their input procurement. Con-
coni et al. (2018) concludes that the ROO of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) reduce imports of inputs from non-member countries, suggesting 
that such rules cause inefficiency in input procurement. Considering tax avoidance, 
this also implies that the ROO can hinder MNEs from shifting profits within the 
firm because they may need to consider whether their intra-firm transactions satisfy 
the requirements of the ROO.
1 See http:// www. oecd. org/ tax/ beps/, accessed on March 11, 2020.
2 For instance, Swenson (2001), Clausing (2003), Cristea and Nguyen (2016) and Davies et al. (2018) 
provided empirical evidence of the transfer price manipulation. Blouin et  al. (2018) found that MNEs 
have conflicting motives for using transfer pricing to lower corporate tax and tariff payments.
3 Regional trade agreements in goods are classified into FTAs and customs unions. Unlike customs 
unions, member countries of an FTA can set their own tariff schedule against non-member countries. 
This offers an opportunity for firms producing outside the FTA to save tariff payments by choosing as 
a transit country the member country whose tariff against non-member countries is low, and then re-
exporting from that country to other FTA member countries whose tariffs against non-member countries 
are higher. Stoyanov (2012) presents evidence of firms’ incentive to transship a good through FTA mem-
bers. To forestall firms from tariff avoidance, FTA members stipulate ROO.
1 3
Tariff elimination versus tax avoidance: free trade agreements…
One way to prove the origin is to satisfy the value-added (VA) criterion, which 
is closely related to transfer price manipulation.4 The VA criterion requires firms to 
add a sufficient value inside FTA member countries. Specifically, let p denote the 
export price of the product and r denote the value of the input materials, which are 
used per unit of final good production and do not originate in the FTA. The VA cri-
terion typically requires that the VA ratio (p − r)∕p is above the specified level. This 
method of calculating the VA content is called the “transaction value method.” The 
value of the input materials depends on the transfer price if MNEs procure inputs 
from related companies outside FTA countries, and, hence, a VA criterion can con-
strain MNEs from engaging in tax avoidance through abusive transfer pricing. How-
ever, a VA criterion allows the MNE an option to meet the ROO without changing 
its input sources. This violates the principal purpose of the ROO to increase local 
procurement of inputs.
Although this possibility has been overlooked in the economic literature on trans-
fer pricing and FTA, it has been noted by some policy researchers. LaNasa (1996) 
stated that “[v]alue-added rules of origin may be circumvented by the use of transfer 
pricing, ... to increase the amount of local value added to ensure that the good quali-
fies as originating in the country of assembly, related parties could reduce the price 
of the imported materials used in the finished product.” Eden (1998) examined the 
ROO of NAFTA and suggested that “...underinvoicing parts coming outside North 
America and overinvoicing locally made parts would increase the North American 
content.” Falvey and Reed (1998) indicated that the VA criterion “...allows room 
for manipulation of prices as well as quantities, and may generate additional incen-
tives for transfer pricing by multinationals.” Reuter (2012) similarly pointed out that 
“most rules of origin are on a percent-of-value basis ...By overinvoicing the value 
added, the MNE can more easily meet a rule-of-origin test and qualify for duty-
free entry for its products into another country in the free trade area.”5 The World 
Customs Organization notes that a disadvantage of the VA criterion of ROO is the 
possible exposure to transfer pricing.6 A recent report by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
Limited reports that exporters should consider an adjustment of transfer prices when 
making use of FTAs.7
As Estevadeordal and Suominen (2003) reported that 68 of the 87 FTAs they 
analyzed employ a VA criterion at least in a particular product category, the 
4 Other ways to prove the origins of products include change in tariff classification criterion and specific 
process criterion. Although the effects of these criteria are also important, this study focuses only on the 
VA criterion.
5 Some practitioners see the link as one factor to be considered, noting that “if transfer pricing changes 
the value of local content, then the ROO as applied may remove any FTA benefit that was previously 
available” (see https:// www. exper tguid es. com/ artic les/ oecd- beps- proje ct- and- trade- new- persp ectiv es/ 
AREXI EUO, accessed on May 3, 2018).
6 See http:// www. wcoomd. org/-/ media/ wco/ public/ global/ pdf/ topics/ origin/ overv iew/ origin- handb ook/ 
rules- of- origin- handb ook. pdf accessed on May 3, 2018.
7 The report states that “...in cases where the preferential calculation is based on the Value Added Rule 
and the required threshold is barely reached, an adjustment of transfer prices might lead to the loss of the 
preferential status of an article.” See https:// www2. deloi tte. com/ conte nt/ dam/ Deloi tte/ ch/ Docum ents/ tax/ 
deloi tte- ch- en- making- use- of- free- trade- agree ments. pdf, accessed on May 1, 2021.
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aforementioned statements suggest that the effect of FTAs on tax avoidance and 
welfare can be understood clearly if we investigate the role of the ROO in restrict-
ing the abusive use of transfer pricing. Given the experience of tax avoidance coun-
tries face, analyzing the anti-tax avoidance aspect of the ROO holds crucial policy 
implications. In reality, different groups of policymakers, namely, customs and tax 
authorities, are responsible for designing trade policies and regulating transfer pric-
ing. The interaction between these two authorities has been rare. According to WCO 
(2018), “...the WCO is working with the OECD and World Bank Group to encour-
age Customs and tax administrations to establish bilateral lines of communication 
in order to exchange knowledge, skills and data, where possible, which will help 
ensure that each authority has the broadest picture of an MNE’s business, its com-
pliance record and can make informed decisions on the collect revenue liability.” 
Thus, the increasing number of FTAs and volume of intra-firm trade necessitates us 
to explore the relationship between transfer prices and ROO.
Against this backdrop, this study builds an international monopoly model to 
investigate an MNE’s response to an FTA formation with two new elements: trans-
fer pricing and ROO.8 We consider a situation wherein an MNE produces final 
goods within an FTA member country and exports the goods to other FTA member 
countries. The MNE procures inputs from either an FTA member country or a low-
tax country outside the FTA. In the absence of ROO, the MNE always prefers to 
produce inputs outside the FTA by itself and avoids tax by setting a high transfer 
price. However, the presence of ROO restricts the manipulation of the transfer price 
because a high transfer price reduces the VA ratio of the final product inside the 
FTA. Thus, the MNE chooses one of three options: (i) fully manipulating its trans-
fer price to avoid tax payments at the expense of the preferential tariff of the FTA, 
(ii) procuring inputs inside an FTA to comply with the ROO and eliminate tariffs, 
or (iii) adjusting its transfer price to comply with the ROO to eliminate tariffs and 
pursue partial tax avoidance.9 This model exhibits the MNE’s choice of the “tariff 
elimination versus tax avoidance” via its location choice of producing inputs and/or 
transfer price manipulation.10
When the MNE chooses the second option, it no longer avoids higher taxes. 
When it chooses the third option, its transfer price deviates from the optimal abu-
sive transfer price, which retains part of the MNE’s tax base in the high-tax country. 
As the ROO restrict the abusive use of transfer pricing through either a change in 
input procurement or an adjustment of the transfer price, tax revenues in a high-
tax country increase. Thus, the VA criterion works as an anti-tax avoidance policy. 
9 Although the MNE uses its transfer price for complying with the ROO, it can still shift profits from 
one country to another to save tax payments when the VA requirement is less stringent and the tax gap is 
large. Nevertheless, the overall tax payments become larger because the transfer price is suboptimal from 
the viewpoint of tax savings.
10 We use the terms “tax rate” and “tax revenue” to represent the corporate tax rate and corporate tax 
revenue, respectively, which we distinguish from the tariff rate and tariff revenue.
8 If we consider local firms among FTA members and oligopoly in the final goods market, the funda-
mental properties of our results remain unchanged, although the analysis becomes more complicated. See 
Mukunoki and Okoshi (2019) for the oligopoly version of the model.
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Interestingly, the direction of shifted profits can be from a low-tax country to a 
high-tax country when the MNE adjusts the transfer price to meet the VA criterion. 
Empirical analyses on transfer pricing should consider the possibility that the VA 
criterion of ROO affects transfer pricing.
The ROO can also increase the welfare gains of FTA countries because mem-
bers can collect tax revenues from the MNE. Although consumers’ gains from the 
FTA are smaller than those without ROO, tax revenues from the MNE can cover the 
smaller consumers’ gains and the loss of tariff revenues. Our results present a new 
role of the ROO in preventing abusive transfer pricing and increasing the welfare 
gains of FTA formation for member countries.
1.1  Literature review
Our model contributes to the literature on transfer pricing policies since MNEs have 
been accused of tax avoidance activities. How to regulate transfer prices has been 
a central issue in policy debates. Several studies examine the effects of policies on 
transfer price manipulation. Elitzur and Mintz (1996) investigated the determinants 
of transfer prices when tax authorities use the cost-plus method to infer the appropri-
ate transfer price. Nielsen et al. (2003) compared the use of transfer prices under two 
international tax systems, namely, separating account and formula apportionment.11
Bond and Gresik (2020) examined a high-tax country’s unilateral adoption of 
border adjusted taxes and cash flow taxes when heterogeneous firms choose either 
arm’s length transactions or to establish their own subsidiaries in their input sourc-
ing. Choi et al. (2020) examined the effect of the arm’s length principle on a monop-
olistic MNE’s transfer pricing and tax competition.12 As their focus was on direct 
regulation on transfer pricing, the role of ROO in preventing abusive transfer pricing 
is overlooked in the literature.
Our second contribution is to the literature on FTAs with ROO. Krishna and 
Krueger (1995) showed that the ROO may work as hidden protection against input 
suppliers outside the FTA. Ju and Krishna (2005) showed that ROO can either 
increase or decrease the price of FTA-made inputs, depending on the number of 
firms complying with the rules. However, their focus was on intermediate goods 
markets, and they did not consider how ROO affect consumers.
Demidova and Krishna (2008) extended the work of Ju and Krishna (2005) by 
including the heterogeneity of productivity of final good producers. They showed 
that productivity sorting ensures the negative relationship between the stringency of 
the rules and the demand for FTA-made inputs (i.e., wages). Ishikawa et al. (2007) 
11 The traditional international corporate tax system is the separating account system that computes 
MNEs’ national tax base by regarding intra-firm transactions as inter-firm transactions. Conversely, 
under the formula apportionment system, the tax payments of MNEs to one country depend on their con-
solidated tax base and the proportion of activity operated in the country. See more details in Chapter XVI 
and Article 86 of European Commission (2011).
12 Bauer and Langenmayr (2013), Choe and Matsushima (2013), and Kato and Okoshi (2019) also 
investigated the effect of the arm’s length principle on the input procurement decision, tacit collusion, 
and input production location, respectively.
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focused on final good markets, showing that the ROO have a role to segment mar-
kets within the FTA, and that both inside and outside firms producing final goods 
may benefit from the ROO at the cost of consumers. Mukunoki (2017) showed that 
an FTA with ROO may harm consumers if it changes outside firms’ location deci-
sions. Mukunoki and Okoshi (2021) investigated a firm’s export price manipulation 
to comply with the ROO, particularly how an MNE’s transfer price manipulation 
affects the inputs imported from outside the FTA. None of these studies, however, 
consider transfer price manipulation to meet ROO. Felbermayr et  al. (2019) sug-
gested that there is little rationale for ROO because tariff circumvention is not profit-
able for 86% of bilateral trade owing to the small differences in external tariffs and 
non-negligible transport costs. This study thus provides a new rationale for the ROO 
from the viewpoint of tax avoidance by an MNE.
This study also examines the connection between transfer pricing and trade pol-
icy. In this regard, Horst (1971) showed that the optimal transfer price is influenced 
by not only tax differentials but also tariffs. Schjelderup and Sorgard (1997) showed 
that if the importing country imposes an ad valorem tariff on inputs, an MNE can 
save tariff payments by reducing its export price. Subsequently, the optimal trans-
fer price is influenced by both corporate tax avoidance and tariff avoidance.13 Kant 
(1988) regarded the transfer price as a tool to repatriate profits when a foreign sub-
sidiary is not fully owned by the parent firm. The study found that even when the 
tax rate in the home country is higher than that in the host country, an MNE has 
an incentive to remit all the profits earned in the low-tax host country. These stud-
ies, however, did not explicitly consider trade liberalization by forming an FTA, let 
alone the effects of ROO on transfer prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and 
derives the equilibrium. Section  3 investigates the effects of FTA formation on 
profit shifting, consumers, and the MNE’s profit. Section 4 discusses total welfare 
of member countries and the effect of input tariff. The last section concludes. An 
Online Appendix shows the results are robust by relaxing some key assumptions.
2  Model
There are three countries, H, F, and O; countries H and F are potential FTA mem-
bers. Figure 1 illustrates the model. A single firm, an MNE, produces a final good 
using inputs and sells it in country F. For simplicity, the benchmark model ignores 
the output market in country H and focuses only on the consumers in country F. This 
assumption does not qualitatively change our main results as long as the two mar-
kets are segmented in the sense that the MNE can make a separate decision in each 




13 Given the multiple roles of transfer prices, the recent literature examines MNEs’ optimal strategies 
(Hyde and Choe 2005; Nielsen et al. 2008; Dürr and Göx 2011). None of them, however, link transfer 
pricing and ROO.
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where x is the consumption of the final good. By utility maximization, the demand 
function becomes x = a − p.
One of the two member countries, country H, has a location advantage for final 
good production because of low factor prices, a large pool of skilled labor and so 
on. Therefore, country H hosts a downstream affiliate of the MNE (firm MH ). The 
MNE’s upstream affiliate (firm MO ) is located in country O. Firm MO may also pro-
duce an input for final good production, as explained below.
Firm MO has already operated in country O and generates positive profits,  , 
which are exogenously given. To produce the final product, firm MH needs to procure 
one unit of inputs for the production of one unit of final products.14 Firm MH can 
procure the input from a perfectly competitive input market inside FTA countries, 
which supply the input at the price of w. Alternatively, firm MO located in country 
O can produce the input at the cost of w − Δ . We assume Δ > 0 and Δ ∈ (0,w] . 
Therefore, input production in country O is more efficient than that in country H. 
This implies that the self-production of the input in country O gives the MNE not 
only a lower input cost but also a tax-saving opportunity via the manipulation of the 
transfer price, which is denoted by r. We assume away transfer pricing that realizes 
negative reported profits because tax authorities can audit tax avoidance.
Without the FTA, country F imposes a specific tariff,  , on imports of the final 
good. We consider the case in which 𝜏 < a − w + Δ holds to rule out zero output in 
14 We can consider a more general situation, wherein the MNE uses a continuum of inputs, and deter-
mines the extent to which it uses intra-firm inputs for final good production. As explained in Online 
Appendix B.1, this modification does not change the qualitative results of the benchmark model.
Fig. 1  Model
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the equilibrium. The governments in countries O and H, respectively, levy t and T as 
a corporate tax on reported profits as well.15 To focus on the effect of FTA formation 
on the final good market, tariffs on inputs are assumed away.16 Hereafter, we focus 
on the case in which T ≥ t holds. Without loss of generality, we set t = 0.
Our assumptions are consistent with observed tax policies. For instance, Mexico 
and Belgium have higher corporate taxes than other countries, and these countries 
are major host countries of export platform foreign direct investment (FDI), where 
the FDI firm exports from the host country to other countries. For example, see 
Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch (2010) for Mexican evidence of its increasing role as a 
host of export platform FDI. Tintelnot (2017) showed the share of output exported 
to countries outside the host country by the United States’ MNEs. For instance, the 
share of exports in Belgium was 63% in 2004.
2.1  The equilibrium without ROO
Let us first derive the market equilibrium without the ROO in each scheme of the MNE 
choice. In the inshoring scheme, denoted as scheme I, the MNE purchases the input 
from local producers. Firm MH earns profits under the cost of inputs w and tax rate 
T. In the offshoring scheme, denoted as scheme O, the MNE’s upstream affiliate in 
country O, firm MO , produces the input at the production cost of w − Δ . Firm MO sells 
the input to firm MH at the input price, denoted by r. Thus, r is the transfer price of the 
MNE.
In the inshoring scheme, the MNE maximizes the post-tax profit, 
Π = (1 − T)(p − w − )x +  , subject to p. The equilibrium price and sales are, 
respectively, given by pI = a+w+
2
 and xI = a−w−
2
 where  is a state variable that 
takes zero if the MNE qualifies for an FTA tariff rate, and unity otherwise. By substitut-
ing them, the equilibrium post-tax profits under the inshoring scheme become
s
i
 represents the reported profits of firm Mi under scheme s ∈ {I,O}.
In the offshoring scheme, the MNE maximizes
with respect to r and p, subject to O
H
≥ 0 and O
O
≥ 0 . Since 𝜕ΠO
𝜕r
= Tx > 0 always 
holds, the MNE is willing to set the optimal transfer price as high as possible. 
(1)


















15 In this model, we postulate that the governments in countries O and H adopt a territorial tax system 
instead of a worldwide one. Most OECD countries, except Chile, Israel, Mexico, and South Korea, have 
adopted a territorial tax system. The USA moved from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system 
in December 2017.
16 This assumption is relaxed in Sect. 4.2.
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Therefore, the optimal abusive transfer price is set at the level that transfers all the 
profits earned in a high-tax country to a low-tax country, r = p − .17 Next, the 
post-tax profits are rewritten as ΠO = [{p −  − (w − Δ)}x + ] . By maximizing 
them with respect to p, the price, sales, and transfer price in equilibrium are given 
by pO = a+w−Δ+
2
 , xO = a−w+Δ−
2
 , and rO = a+w−Δ−
2
 , respectively. Thus, the post-
tax profits under the offshoring scheme are given by
Irrespective of the formation of an FTA, the MNE always prefers the offshoring 
scheme to the inshoring scheme, as
holds given  , because xO > xI . Intuitively, the offshoring generates more profits 
because procurement from its upstream affiliate provides the MNE with both effi-
cient input production and the opportunity to shift profits.
For notational convenience, we use the superscript “ ∗ ” for the variables in the 
pre-FTA case and “ ̂  ” for the post-FTA variables without ROO hereafter.
2.2  The equilibrium with ROO
Let us next consider an FTA formation with the ROO. As stated in the Introduction, 
our focus is on the VA criterion of ROO. Specifically, a VA criterion is applied to 
exports of the final good in the FTA. For notational convenience, we use “ ̃  ” as a 
circumflex for the variables in the presence of the ROO. After an FTA is formed, 
firm MH needs to meet the VA criterion to be eligible for the elimination of  . Spe-
cifically, the ROO require firm MH to add a proportion of at least  (∈ (0, 1]) of the 
values of exported goods within FTA. There are three cases that we explain sequen-
tially below.
First, if firm MH chooses the offshoring of input production and sets an abusive 
transfer price, r = p , the VA ratio is always zero, which fails to meet the require-
ments of the ROO. Hence, the final goods exports of the MNE incur tariff  , even 
after the formation of the FTA. We call this case scheme N (non-compliance).18 The 
equilibrium outcomes of this scheme are obtained by setting  = 1 in pO , xO , and 
rO , as well as in the other corresponding welfare components. Second, if firm MH 
chooses the inshoring of input production (scheme I), the VA ratio is 1, and it satis-
fies the requirement of the ROO. The equilibrium outcomes are obtained by setting 
 = 0 in pI and xI.
(3)ΠO = (xO)2 + .
(4)ΠO − ΠI = (xO)2 − (1 − T)(xI)2 ≥ 0
17 We assume there is no cost of shifting profits across countries. This is a conventional way of deter-
mining the optimal transfer price in the literature, when the cost of profit shifting is absent. We relax this 
assumption by introducing a standard convex concealment cost in Online Appendix B.2.
18 Some empirical evidence shows that not all firms use FTA tariffs, because of the existence of the 
ROO, that is, the effects of FTA formation are heterogeneous across firms. See, for example, Takahashi 
and Urata (2010) and Hayakawa et al. (2013).
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Third, if firm MH chooses the offshoring of the input production and sets p and r 
such that they satisfy
it complies with the ROO, and the tariff is thus eliminated. A combination of p and r 
that realizes (5) with strict inequality cannot be the equilibrium price. In Sect. 2.1, 
we show that the MNE’s post-tax profit after FTA formation is maximized by setting 
p = r without the ROO. This implies that, as long as p−r
p
> 𝛼 holds, the MNE always 
has an incentive to reduce p − r by adjusting p and r.19 Therefore, the MNE opti-
mally sets p and r such that (5) is satisfied with equality, which yields:
We call this case scheme B (binding ROO).





(> w − Δ) represents the “perceived marginal cost” of producing 
the final good.20 The perceived marginal cost is higher than the physical marginal 
cost, w − Δ , as long as  is positive and T > 0 . Both an increase in the stringency of 
the ROO (i.e.,  ) and the tax in country H (i.e., T) increases the perceived marginal 
cost. We can interpret the perceived marginal cost as follows. Without any ROO, the 
MNE shifts all the profits to a low-tax country by setting r = p . From r = p , the 
introduction of the ROO decreases the transfer price by as much as p and increases 
the per-unit tax payments of the MNE by as much as 𝛼pT > 0 . This means that the 
ROO decrease the MNE’s marginal gains from selling the final good in terms of the 
post-tax profits. Therefore, the MNE becomes less aggressive in the product market 
under scheme B. The lower incentive to sell the final good is reflected in the per-
ceived marginal cost. The price setting of the MNE is made with cM instead of 
w − Δ , that is, the binding ROO increase the equilibrium price, since cM > w − Δ 
holds.
By maximizing (7) with respect to p, we obtain equilibrium price, sales, and 
transfer price as p̃B = a+cM
2
 , x̃B = a−cM
2





 , respectively. We 





(6)r = (1 − )p.
(7)








= {1 − T}(p − cM)x + ,
19 For instance, the MNE can always reduce its tax payments and increase the post-tax profits by 
increasing r and setting p such that it does not affect its sales in the product market.
20 The terminology “perceived marginal cost” is often used in the analysis of vertically related industries 
in the context of industrial organization. See Choi et al. (2020) for an application of this terminology in 
the tax avoidance literature.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that an FTA is formed and the MNE chooses offshoring. The 
ROO induce the MNE to set a lower transfer price and a higher output price if it 
complies with the ROO.
Proof See Appendix A.1.
The MNE adjusts both transfer price and output price to satisfy (5). If the MNE 
keeps p = p̂O and only lowers r to satisfy the VA ratio, the increase in the tax burden 
hurts the MNE more. If the MNE only raises p keeping r = r̂O , it loses its profit in 
the product market even more. The rise in output price implies that the tariff pass-
through is smaller with the ROO than without them because a part of tariff reduc-
tion is countered by an adjustment of the output price to meet the VA criterion. A 
smaller tariff pass-through reduces the consumers’ gains from an FTA formation, as 
shown in Sect. 3.2.
By substituting the equilibrium price and sales, the equilibrium post-tax profit of 
the MNE under scheme B becomes
Π̃B is a decreasing function of  because an increase in  forces the MNE to set a 
transfer price and an output price that deviate more from the levels at which it avoids 
tax payments in the high-tax country.
2.3  The MNE’s choice of scheme
In Sect. 2.1, we have argued that the MNE always chooses scheme O before an FTA 
formation, and also after an FTA formation without the ROO. In an FTA formation 
with the ROO, schemes I, N, and B are possible equilibrium outcomes. Among the 
three possible schemes (I, N, and B), the MNE chooses the one that maximizes its 
profits.
Let us first compare Π̃I with Π̃N . Since both profits are independent of the VA 
threshold,  , the tariff level and tax differential determine which profit is larger. The 
MNE faces a trade-off between tax avoidance and tariff avoidance. If the tax dif-
ferential is large, the MNE prefers scheme N to scheme I because of the stronger 
incentive to avoid tax payments in country H. If the tax differential is small, scheme 
I is preferable for the MNE. Thus, there exists a unique threshold of T, T̃  , such that 





{(1 − T)a − w + Δ}2
4(1 − T)
+ .





< 1 . We can confirm that T̃  is positive if 
and only if Δ < 𝜏 holds. To secure the existence of the equilibrium with scheme I, we additionally 
assume Δ < 𝜏 hereafter.
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Next, we compare the profits in scheme B with those in schemes N and I. Π̃B 
is decreasing in  , and Π̃B = Π̂O holds at  = 0 , which is larger than Π̃N and Π̃I . 
Therefore, we can derive a unique threshold, N (resp. I ), above which the MNE 
prefers scheme N (resp. scheme I) to scheme B. Intuitively, under a less-strict ROO, 
the MNE prefers scheme B to schemes N and I because adjusting the transfer price 
to comply with those ROO becomes less costly as the VA criterion becomes less 
stringent. In other words, the profits of MNE from tariff elimination, by adjusting 
the transfer price, become smaller as the FTA is attached to more stringent ROO.
Putting the above comparisons together, we characterize the equilibrium out-
comes as follows:
Proposition 2 The MNE chooses offshoring (scheme O) before an FTA formation or 
after an FTA formation without the ROO. After an FTA formation with the ROO, the 
MNE chooses (i) inshoring (scheme I) if T ≤ T̃  and 𝛼 > 𝛼I hold, (ii) offshoring and 
its exports incur a tariff (scheme N) if �T < T  and 𝛼 > 𝛼N hold, and (iii) offshoring, 
and it then adjusts its transfer price to meet the ROO (scheme B) if  ≤ min{I , N} 
holds.
Proof See Appendix A.2.
The equilibrium outcomes with the ROO are illustrated in Fig.  2. The MNE 
always chooses the self-production of inputs before an FTA is formed. After an FTA 
is formed, this proposition suggests that the MNE may change its input procurement 
from self-production to the purchase of local inputs, despite higher production cost. 
As Conconi et al. (2018) showed, the ROO lower the likelihood of input procure-
ment from non-FTA countries. This “input trade diversion” corresponds to the area 
of scheme I in Fig. 2.
Further, as Takahashi and Urata (2010) and Hayakawa et al. (2013) noted, some 
firms may not use FTA tariffs because of the burden of the ROO. This possibility 
corresponds to the area of scheme N in Fig. 2. A standard explanation for the non-
use of an FTA is that export firms must incur additional costs to meet the ROO. Our 
Fig. 2  The equilibrium MNE’s 
choice
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model suggests another burden of meeting the ROO: It increases tax payments by 
restricting the MNE’s freedom to adjust its transfer price.
3  Effects of FTA formation
We have explored the equilibrium outcomes of an FTA with the ROO. This sec-
tion analyzes how an FTA formation prevents the MNE’s profit shifting and how it 
affects the consumer surplus and the MNE’s profit.
3.1  FTA as an anti‑tax avoidance policy
Let us explore how an FTA formation affects the MNE’s tax avoidance. When the 
MNE engages in transfer pricing, an FTA with the ROO enables member countries 
to recover some of the MNE’s tax bases. When the MNE procures the input from 
the local input market (scheme I), there are no opportunities to shift profits, and all 
the tax bases are retained in country H. When it adjusts its transfer price to meet the 
VA criterion of the ROO, a part of the tax base is retained in country H because of 
the limited use of abusive transfer pricing.
Notably, we can confirm that the ROO reverse the direction of profit shifting 
across countries. To see this point more clearly, it is useful to decompose the opti-
mal transfer prices into the “tax avoidance motive” and “tariff elimination motive.” 
In the pre-FTA equilibrium, the optimal transfer price is always above the marginal 
cost of input production:
The second term of (9) represents the tax avoidance motive, which makes the trans-
fer price as high as making the profit of the downstream affiliate of the MNE zero.
In scheme B of the post-FTA equilibrium, the tariff elimination motive counters 
the tax avoidance motive. The optimal transfer price is expressed as
The third term of (10) captures the tariff elimination motive, which is zero at  = 0 
and increasing in  . If the tariff elimination motive is sufficiently large, such that 
r̃B is lower than w − Δ , then the profits of the MNE shift from a low-tax country to 
a high-tax country, which is in sharp contrast to the conventional effect of transfer 
pricing.
(9)
r = w − Δ +






r̃B = w − Δ +
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Therefore, the direction of profit shifting relies on the size of the two motives. 
Indeed, we can derive a unique threshold of  , r , such that �rB < w − Δ holds and 
profits shift from a high-tax country to a low-tax country if 𝛼 > 𝛼r holds. Figure 3 
illustrates the reversal of profit shifting.22 The dotted curve represents r , and the 
dotted area in the figure represents the case in which profits flow from a low-tax 
country to a high-tax country. The following proposition summarizes the effect on 
tax revenue.
Proposition 3 An FTA formation with the ROO reduces the profits of the MNE that 
are shifted from a high-tax country to a low-tax country if the MNE uses an FTA 
tariff. The MNE shifts its profits from a low-tax country to a high-tax country if the 
tariff elimination motive of transfer pricing is sufficiently large.
Proof See Appendix A.3.
This proposition sheds new light on the role of the ROO that has been overlooked 
in policy debates. As Proposition 2 shows, an FTA formation with the ROO can 
induce the MNE to abandon the self-production of inputs as an opportunity to avoid 
tax.23 This result suggests that a VA criterion provides another channel to keep 
MNEs away from tax avoidance by restricting the extent of abusive transfer pricing. 
Although the main purpose of imposing the ROO is to prevent trade circumvention, 
the ROO also play a role in preventing tax avoidance.
Fig. 3  The direction of the 
MNE’s shifted profits
23 This effect is observed in the other two criteria of ROO, that is, the change in tariff classification 
(CTC) criterion and specific process (SP) criterion. Specifically, the CTC criterion requires the Harmo-
nized System (HS) code of exported goods must be different at a specified level from the HS codes of all 
non-originating materials. If the CTC criterion requires the changes in high digits of the HS codes, such 
as those in the first two digits (i.e., changes in tariff chapter) or the first four digits (i.e., changes in tariff 
heading), the exported goods and the imported materials may share the same HS codes. In this case, the 
MNE needs to procure inputs inside the FTA to meet the CTC criterion. The MNE also needs to procure 
inputs inside the FTA if the SP criterion requires that input materials, which the MNE initially produces 
outside the FTA, should be produced inside the FTA.
22 We use the following parameters for the figure: a = 1 , w = 1
2
 , Δ = 1
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Furthermore, Proposition 3 provides a new empirical implication for estimat-
ing transfer pricing. As our model shows, the optimal transfer price depends on 
the stringency of the VA criterion, suggesting that the observed transfer prices can 
reflect not only the tax avoidance motive but also the tariff elimination motive.24
3.2  Effects on consumer surplus and the MNE’s overall profit
Let us next explore the effect of an FTA formation on consumers and the MNE’s 
overall profit. Under scheme I, FTA formation increases the marginal cost of pro-
duction from w − Δ to w because the MNE changes the location of its input pro-
curement. However, the FTA formation also eliminates the tariff,  , faced by the 
MNE. We can easily confirm the following: The MNE chooses scheme I only if 
Δ < 𝜏 holds (see footnote 21). Therefore, an FTA always decreases the MNE’s mar-
ginal cost of exports whenever scheme I becomes the equilibrium outcome, and it 
always increases the exports of the MNE.25 Tariff elimination increases the free-
on-board (f.o.b) price, p −  , but its degree is always less than the tariff level, and it 
decreases the consumer price. Thus, an FTA formation benefits consumers and the 
MNE under scheme I.
Under scheme B, the MNE also faces a higher marginal cost because the per-
ceived marginal cost is higher than w − Δ . As in scheme I; however, the MNE 
chooses scheme B only if the cost reduction from tariff elimination dominates the 
increase in the marginal cost of production (see Appendix A.2 for details). There-
fore, the FTA always increases the exports of the MNE whenever scheme B becomes 
the equilibrium outcome. As before, the tariff elimination increases the f.o.b price 
and decreases the consumer price. Thus, an FTA formation benefits consumers and 
the MNE under scheme B.
Under scheme N, the situation is the same as that in the pre-FTA equilibrium, and 
the FTA has no effects on the equilibrium outcomes. Putting the two cases together, 
we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 An FTA formation with the ROO always benefits consumers and the 
MNE if the MNE uses an FTA tariff, whereas it has no effect on consumers and the 
MNE otherwise. However, the presence of the ROO decreases both consumers’ and 
the MNE’s gains, compared to an FTA without ROO.
Proof See Appendix A.4.
Although FTA formation is beneficial for consumers and the MNE, the ROO 
decrease their gains because of the increase in the production cost owing to the inef-
ficient procurement of inputs (scheme I) or increase in the perceived marginal costs 
24 Although there are other ways of shifting profits, such as using internal debt and making royalty pay-
ments, the tariff elimination motive behind the transfer pricing of tangible assets remains.
25 Specifically, the change in exports becomes ΔxI∗ = x̃I − xO∗ = −Δ
2
 , which is positive if Δ < 𝜏 holds.
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(Scheme B). In scheme B, the MNE gives up full tax avoidance, and the adjustment 
of transfer price to meet the ROO increases the MNE’s perceived marginal cost. We 
should recognize this export-decreasing effect of the ROO driven by the change in 
the MNE’s transfer pricing.
4  Discussion
We have shown that an FTA with ROO can prevent the MNE’s tax avoidance. In this 
section, we explore how FTA formation affects the total welfare of member coun-
tries. This study employs a partial-equilibrium model focusing on one industry, and 
we should be careful about evaluating the welfare impacts of FTA because there 
should also be gains/losses in other industries. Nevertheless, our analysis provides a 
new element to consider the desirability of FTA.
Besides that, the benchmark model also assumes that country H does not impose 
a tariff on inputs imported from country O. The member countries may have an 
incentive to prevent tax avoidance by the MNE by setting a high tariff on inputs, 
which reduces the gains from producing inputs outside the FTA. This diminishes 
the role of the ROO in preventing abusive transfer pricing. We show that the main 
results of the benchmark model remain unchanged even if country O optimally sets 
the level of input tariff.
4.1  Total welfare of member countries
To explore the welfare effects of FTAs, we focus on the total welfare of FTA coun-
tries. The total welfare of FTA countries under scheme s ∈ {I,O,B,N} is the sum 
of the consumer surplus in country F ( CSs
F
 ), tax revenues of country H paid by the 
MNE ( TRs
H
 ), and tariff revenues in country F ( TRs
F
):
Total welfare does not include the post-tax profits of the MNE because it is owned 
by residents outside the FTA. We have the following proposition. See Online Appen-
dix B.3 for the proof.
Proposition 5 An FTA formation without the ROO benefits member countries when 
the initial tariff rate is high ( 𝜏 > 𝜏W ) and hurts them when it is low ( 𝜏 < 𝜏W ). An 
FTA formation with the ROO benefits member countries if (i) the post-FTA scheme 
is scheme I, and T > �TW holds or (ii) the post-FTA scheme is scheme B and 𝛼 > 𝛼W 
holds. It has no effect on member countries if the post-FTA scheme is N. Otherwise, 
an FTA with the ROO hurts member countries.
Let us first explain the welfare effect of an FTA formation without ROO. The 
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collect tax revenues both before and after the FTA formation. The FTA gener-
ates a trade-off between an increase in the consumer surplus and disappearance of 
tariff revenues. When the initial tariff rate is high ( 𝜏 > 𝜏W ), the consumers’ gains 
exceed tariff revenues and the FTA formation increases the total welfare of member 
countries.
The presence of the ROO changes the welfare effect of FTA formation. The FTA 
has no effect if the post-FTA equilibrium scheme is scheme N, but it affects the total 
welfare in scheme I or scheme B. As discussed in Sect. 3.2, the ROO reduce con-
sumer gains from FTA formation in country F in these schemes. However, the ROO 
also help generate tax revenues in country H if the MNE changes its input procure-
ment from country O to country I, or it adjusts its transfer price to comply with the 
ROO. Thus, the ROO can either increase or decrease the welfare gains from FTA 
formation.
If the post-FTA scheme is scheme I, an FTA formation improves the total welfare 
of the FTA members when the tax gap is relatively high, and the positive effects 
from generating tax revenue are large enough. Similarly, if the post-FTA scheme is 
scheme B and  is high, then the MNE needs to adjust its transfer price to comply 
with the ROO. In this case, the positive effect from gaining the tax revenue is large 
enough to improve total welfare.
We found there exists a case wherein an FTA without the ROO worsens total 
welfare, but an FTA with the ROO improves it. There is also a case where an FTA 
with the ROO improves the total welfare, but an FTA without the ROO worsens it 
(see Online Appendix B.3 for details). However, note that this study employs a par-
tial equilibrium model that focuses on one specific sector. In reality, an FTA should 
affect many sectors. The welfare effects discussed here explain only a part of the 
overall effects of the FTA. Nevertheless, the analysis of this study is distinct in that 
it suggests a new mechanism through which the ROO change the welfare effects of 
an FTA formation.
4.2  A tariff on inputs
In the benchmark model, we have assumed that country H imposes no tariff on 
imported inputs. Given the zero external tariff, only the ROO can hinder the MNE’s 
transfer pricing. However, country H may have an incentive to set an input tariff to 
prevent the loss of the tax revenue. Even if we consider an input tariff, and its degree 
is determined endogenously by country H, the main results of the baseline model 
holds, as long as the corporate tax in country H is not very high. See Online Appen-
dix B.4 for the detailed discussion.
This is because, with a low corporate tax in country H, the main source of coun-
try H’s welfare is not the tax revenue from the MNE, but the tariff revenue from the 
input tariff. Let  be a tariff on inputs in country H. Then, country H’s welfare is 




 ) if inputs are produced in country 
H, or the tariff revenue ( TRO
H
= xO ) if inputs are produced in country O. If  exceeds 
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is satisfied for some 𝜉 < 𝜉M such that TROH > TR
I
H
 holds, the optimal external tariff to 
maximize tariff revenue becomes T =
a−w+Δ−
2
 . In this case, country H does not 





 always holds and country H sets the tariff that induces inshor-
ing,  ≥ M . As our main results are obtained when T is small, they are not qualita-
tively changed by introducing an input tariff of country H.
Although introducing an input tariff does not change the main results, it is 
worth discussing which members of the FTA, country H or country F, benefit 
more from imposing an import tariff that hinders transfer pricing (i.e.,  ≥ M ). If 
a − w − 𝜏 < Δ holds, then 𝜉T < Δ , and the MNE’s marginal cost is lower under off-
shoring. In this case, country F prefers offshoring because the MNE’s exports to 
country F is larger. If a − w − 𝜏 > Δ holds, we have 𝜉T > Δ and the MNE’s mar-
ginal cost is lower under inshoring conditions. In this case, country F prefers inshor-




 and a − w − 𝜏 < Δ holds, an input tariff that pre-





and a − w − 𝜏 > Δ holds, the prohibitive input tariff benefits country F but hurts 
country H. In other cases, the prohibitive input tariff either benefits or hurts the two 
countries at the same time.
5  Conclusion
The recent proliferation of FTAs has been advancing trade liberalization among 
countries, and the cross-border economic activities of MNEs prevail globally. This 
study investigated a vertically integrated MNE’s input production and pricing strate-
gies to analyze the welfare effects of FTA formation when the MNE can manipulate 
its transfer price of intra-firm trade. As in previous studies, the MNE uses its transfer 
price to avoid a high corporate tax. After the formation of an FTA, however, there 
emerges another reason for transfer price manipulation in the presence of the ROO. 
Specifically, if the ROO of the FTA employ a VA criterion, the FTA induces the 
MNE to manipulate the transfer price to comply with the ROO and be eligible for 
tariff elimination.
When the VA criterion of the ROO is low, the MNE prefers transfer price manipula-
tion, since adjusting the transfer price is straightforward. However, once the required 
VA level is high, the transfer price adjustment decreases the efficiency of tax avoid-
ance, such that the manipulation of the transfer price for the ROO is suboptimal. If the 
tax gap between a country outside an FTA and a member country is large, the MNE 
produces a necessary input in the outside country at the expense of the FTA tariff rate 
because the gain from tax avoidance is large. If it is small, the MNE procures the input 
into the inside country to qualify for the FTA tariff. This result is in line with empirical 
and anecdotal evidence that (i) FTAs sometimes induce input relocation to inside FTA 
countries, (ii) not all firms export using the preferential tariffs of FTAs, and (iii) transfer 
price manipulation is influenced by both the difference in corporate tax rates and the 
required VA criterion of ROO.
1 3
Tariff elimination versus tax avoidance: free trade agreements…
Our model also showed the possibility that ROO can prevent profit shifting by an 
MNE by either a change in procurement strategy or another use of transfer prices. The 
formation of FTAs with the ROO is expected to work as an effective policy to not only 
induce trade liberalization, but also keep MNEs away from tax avoidance.
A remarkable result is the MNE’s profits can be shifted from a low-tax country to a 
high-tax country when the MNE manipulates the transfer price for the ROO, contrary 
to the case where it uses the transfer price for tax avoidance. Although the ROO reduce 
consumers’ gains of the FTA formation, member countries can benefit more with the 
ROO owing to the emergence of the MNE’s tax base. There is a case where the ROO 
can transform a welfare-reducing FTA into a welfare-improving one.
There remains room for further research. We assumed that tax rates and tariff rates 
are exogenously given. It would be intriguing to investigate how the formation of an 
FTA affects the outcomes of tax competition among countries as well as the optimal 
tariffs set by FTA members. Another direction in which to extend the model is to exam-
ine the effects of regulations on transfer pricing, such as the arm’s length principle, 
in the presence of ROO. Finally, further empirical investigation on the relationship 
between ROO and transfer pricing is essential.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
By comparing the equilibrium output prices, we have �pB − �pO = cM−(w−Δ)
2
> 0 . By 
comparing the equilibrium transfer prices, we obtain 




< 0 , where the first inequality is due to 
a > (w − Δ).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Without the ROO, (4) indicates that the MNE always chooses scheme O before an FTA 
formation. With the ROO, the post-tax profits of the MNE under schemes N and I are 
given by
The condition under which the MNE prefers scheme I to scheme N is given by
From (8), we can easily confirm that the following inequality holds:








(A.3)�ΠI − �ΠN > 0 ⟺ T < 1 −
(
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Further, the first derivative of Π̃B with respect to  is
Let x denote the cutoff level of x such that x̃B = xO∗(= x̃N) holds. Specifically, we 
have
If evaluated at  = x , (8) becomes
This implies that there exists a unique cutoff level of  , N ∈ (0, x) , such that 
Π̃B ≥ Π̃N holds with  ≤ N and T ≥ T̃  . Moreover, remember that 𝜕�Π
I
𝜕T
< 0 and 
Π̃I = Π̃N holds at T = T̃  . Then,
holds for any T ∈ [0, T̃] . Note that �ΠB > �ΠI holds if the following condition is 
satisfied:
This implies that there exists a unique cutoff level of  , I ∈ (0, x) , such that 





≤ T < �T .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
From (10), we obtain
Therefore, �rB = w − Δ + a−w+Δ
2
> w − Δ holds at  = 0 and r̃B takes the minimum 
value at  = 1 , which is given by
Scheme B is the equilibrium at any  if T < �T  holds. Therefore, there exists a unique 
r such that �rB < w − Δ holds when 𝛼 > 𝛼r holds.
(A.4)�ΠB|𝛼=0 =
(a − w + Δ)2
4









B ⋛ xO∗ ⟺  ⋚

(w − Δ + )T
≡ x.
(A.7)�ΠB|𝛼=𝛼x =
(w − Δ)(a − w + Δ − 𝜏)2






(A.8)�ΠI > �ΠI|T=�T = �Π
N > �ΠB|𝛼=𝛼x










(1 − 𝛼T)2 + (1 − T)(w − Δ)
2(1 − 𝛼T)2
< 0.
(A.11)�rB|𝛼=1 = 0 < w − Δ.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Under scheme I, the changes in the amount of supplies from the pre-FTA equilib-
rium to the post-FTA equilibrium without the ROO are
because 𝜏 > Δ holds. Under scheme B, the FTA formation increases the amount of 
exports to country F when 𝛼 < 𝛼x holds. From Proposition 2, we know that 𝛼 < 𝛼x 
holds under scheme B and we always have �xB > xO∗ . In addition, we can easily con-
firm that
holds.
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